The orthodox view explains the war's one-sidedness in terms of the Coalition's strengths, especially its advanced technology, which is often held to have destroyed the Iraqis' equipment or broken their will without exposing Coalition forces to extensive close combat on the ground.
It does not embody official training doctrine. Although called a historical study, it is not such according to a precise interpretation of the term. It is rather a series of interesting and instructive small unit actions based on the personal experience of Germans who actually took part in them.
Clausewitz wrote that, in the art of war, experience is worth more than all philosophical truth. This pamphlet is published with that thought in mind, tempered with the truth that investigation, observation, and analysis are necessary to give full meaning to experience. A careful study of the examples in the text will provide many lessons in tactics, logistics, and techniques, in the coordination of weapons, in the influence of terrain, climatic and weather conditions upon operations, and in the qualities of the officers and men who fought on the Russian front.
It is only by utilizing German experience that the best insight into the fighting on that front can be secured. To the average military student a thorough and detailed knowledge of the fighting and living conditions on the battlefield is of far greater benefit than a superficial acquaintance with large operations, which are primarily the province of commanders and staffs of the higher commands.
In his Battle Studies, Ardant du Picq stated the same idea as follows: The smallest detail, taken from an actual incident in war, is more instructive for me, a soldier, than all the Thiers and Jominis in the world.
They speak, no doubt, for the heads of states and armies but they never show me what I wish to know—a battalion, a company, a squad, in action. The young officer, lacking practical wartime experience, will find much information in field manuals and service regulations, but such texts will not stimulate his imagination or understanding of battle.
These must be stimulated and developed by other means, if the principles propounded in manuals are to become a live part in the professional preparation of small unit commanders before they participate in battle. One of the most vivid media of instruction that can be drawn from military history is the small unit action based on personal experience.
A number of books dealing with small unit actions have been published. One of the first was Freytag-Loringhoven's Das Exerzier Reglement fur die Infanterie, which appeared in and which attempted to show the validity of selected statements in the German field manual for Infantry by subjecting them to the test of military history.
Army training during the 's.
These pamphlets are essentially small unit actions. The actions contained herein describe the Russian soldier, his equipment, and his combat methods under a variety of circumstances and conditions as seen by his opponent—the German.
The narratives are intended to supplement the theoretical knowledge of Russian combat doctrine during World War II that can be acquired from the study of manuals. Whereas the military doctrines of the nations vary little, the application of these doctrines differs greatly between countries.
The chief characteristics of Russian combat methods during World War II were the savagery, fanaticism, and toughness of the individual soldier and the lavish prodigality with human life by the Soviet high command.
The actions here described are based solely on German source material, primarily in the form of narratives of personal experience. General Haider, like many of our own high-ranking officers, has on numerous occasions expressed interest in small unit actions and has often stressed their importance in training junior leaders.
These wTere analyzed for content, presentation, and pertinence to the subject. The better ones were then rewritten, edited, and arranged in chronological sequence to give the best possible coverage to the different phases of the German campaign in Russia.
Under the direction of Lt. Blau, Chief, and 1st Lt. Garand of the Writing and Translation Section. Although the original German source material has undergone considerable revision, every effort has been made to retain the point of view, the expression, and even the prejudices of the original.SMALL UNIT ACTIONS DURING THE GERMAN CAMPAIGN IN RUSSIA by General-Major Burkhart Mueiler-Hillebrand, General-Major Heilmuth Reinhardt, and others.
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY PAMPHLET NO. FOREWORD. This book tells the history of the Normandy campain from the German viewpoint. It is an excellant review of this struggle, based on surviving German records, and contains many facts not mentioned by British or American historions of this battle.
What makes this story worth telling is the development of one idea: the blitzkrieg. The German Army had a greater grasp of the effects of technology on the battlefield, and went on to develop a new form of warfare by which its rivals when it came to the test were hopelessly outclassed.
The Blitz was a German bombing offensive against Britain in and , during the Second World plombier-nemours.com term was first used by the British press and is the German word for 'lightning'. The Germans conducted mass air attacks against industrial targets, towns, and cities, beginning with raids on London towards the end of the Battle of Britain in , a battle for daylight air superiority.
Len Deighton is the author of several fiction and nonfiction books on World War II.
In his latest book, Blitzkrieg: From the Rise of Hitler to the Fall of Dunkirk, he provides a detailed account. Page ii. The United States Strategic Bombing Survey FOREWORD. The United States Strategic Bombing Survey was established by the Secretary of War on November 3, , pursuant to a directive from the late President Roosevelt.